As you advance through the episodes, the events surrounding the attack and its tremendous fallout should unfold before you.

First Wave

Earlier that morning, Stevens had met with several people at the compound, including the Turkish consul Ali Akin, who would later remark to the Times on the lack of adequate security at the compound, saying, “No security men, no diplomats, nobody….There was no deterrence.”

After Stevens retired to his room at about 9:00 p.m. local time, security camera footage reviewed by American officials showed the Libyan police vehicle stationed outside the compound gates leaving its post and driving away. At approximately 9:40 p.m., agents were alerted of the attackers’ presence by noises of yelling, chanting, and finally, an explosion. Moments later, the monitor in the facilities Tactical Operations Center (TOC) would show an armed throng rushing through the gate, met by at least one armed local guard.

After seeing the crowd rush through the gate, a Diplomatic Security (DS) agent stationed in the TOC sounded an audible alarm throughout the compound, alerting its occupants that the compound was under attack. After issuing the alarm, he would then go on to contact the CIA Annex located about a mile away. This line of contact remained open throughout the attack.

At the time of the attack, there were four DS agents in the compound where Ambassador Stevens was residing. Three left to retrieve weapons and tactical gear, while another, Sean Smith, accompanied Stevens to a safe haven in the building — a fortified area designed to protect the Ambassador from such attacks as this one. The armed guards, referred to as the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, who met the attackers at the gate were corralled into their barracks, which were then set on fire. None of the Martyrs Brigade would be killed that night.

At 10:05 p.m., when the White House was just receiving news of the attack, Villa C, which contained the safe haven occupied by Stevens and two DS agents, was engulfed in flames. Contact between Stevens and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli had been severed. The DS agent with Smith and Stevens later reported that he led the two into the bathroom, planning to escape through a window there, but found that Stevens and Smith were no longer behind him. He escaped the room to gain relief from the harsh smoke and heat but returned into the building multiple times in an attempt to recover the two men.

In a later recovery mission, a DS agent recovered Smith from the building and he was unresponsive. At 11:01 p.m., Sean Smith was declared to be killed in action. It would not be until about 1:00 a.m. that local Libyans would recover Stevens’ remains from the main building and transport them to the hospital.

Before contact with Tripoli was lost, Ambassador Stevens managed to inform the Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, Gregory Hicks, of the attack. Hicks led the Embassy staff to take immediate action, requesting permission to redirect a drone in eastern Libya to Benghazi in order to obtain an image of what was occurring on the ground and preparing a rescue team, Team Tripoli. Team Tripoli departed the Tripoli Mitiga Airport at approximately 12:30 a.m., headed for Benghazi, where they would arrive around 5:00 a.m.

Second Wave

While the DS agents were attempting to recover Stevens’ body (they assumed he would not have survived in the building), a second explosion occurred inside the rear gate of the compound. As members of the Global Response Staff (GRS) from the Annex returned fire on the attackers, the Diplomatic Security team packed up and fled the compound in their vehicle, coming under fire from hidden attackers on their way out. As they drove away from the complex, the vehicle came under fire from a man on the road and had two grenades thrown under it, blowing out two of its tires, but not stopping the vehicle. They arrived at the Annex at 11:23 p.m., closely followed by the GRS team who arrived about twenty minutes later to take up defensive positions on the roof of the Annex.

Only an hour later, a group of attackers converged upon the Annex from the East, using small firearms and IEDs to assault the compound. After ten minutes of fighting, the GRS team was able to repel the attackers, who were using a civilian home to defend themselves, knowing the GRS wouldn’t risk harming civilians. In a more organized attempt, the attackers returned more forcibly with increased numbers and sustained heavy fire.

After another break in the fighting, Team Tripoli arrived and was prepared to assist. Shortly before sunrise, another round of small arms fire and mortar attacks occurred, killing two Tripoli fighters, Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty.

At 6:16 a.m., a 50-vehicle armed motorcade supplied by the Libyan Military Intelligence arrived to evacuate all personnel from the annex and deliver them to the airport where they would evacuate to Germany and Tripoli. Interestingly, the group that came to the aid of Americans in Benghazi was not the Libyan government that the State had been attempting to create good relations with, but a group of former military officers under the Qadhafi regime who the U.S. had a role in ousting. Before that night, the CIA had no knowledge of who the Libyan Military Intelligence were.

By the time the sun had risen on the 12th, four Americans had been lost, and the rest were fleeing the country.

Works Cited

“9/11 Attacks.” History.com. A&E Television Networks, 2010. http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks.

Alvarez, Priscilla. “What Happened the Night of the Benghazi Attack.” The Atlantic. June 28, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/house-republicans-benghazi-report-hillary-clinton/489125/.

“Benghazi on the Record: Asked and Answered.” The Select Committee on Benghazi. http://askedandanswered-democrats.benghazi.house.gov/ .

Kirkpatrick, David D., “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi.” New York Times, Dec. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0.

Leiberman, Joseph I. and Susan M. Collins. “Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi.” United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Dec. 30 2012, Google Scholar, http://www.passionforliberty.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Flashing-Red-HSGAC-Special-Report-final.pdf.

“Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.” U.S. House of Representatives. Select Committee on Benghazi. Dec 7, 2016, http://benghazi.house.gov/NewInfo.

Appendix

House Rep. Peter Roskam – Summary of the Benghazi Report Findings (Youtube Video)

Diagram of the U.S. Benghazi Mission via the Wall Street Journal

Map of the Northern Border of Libya via the New York Times

New York Times graphic of the Mission and CIA Annex

Pentagon Timeline of the Attack

In order to fully grasp the climate in Libya surrounding the Benghazi attack, we also need to consider the after-effects of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010-2011. Over the course of this very short period, there were widespread anti-government and pro-democracy movements, resulting in the unseating of autocratic leaders in some cases and bloody conflict in others. In the wake of the Arab Spring, fledgling democracies are unstable and their people are restless. In many places, it has resulted in economic collapse, dysfunctional politics, and the rise of political Islam. In the wake of the Arab Spring, countries like Egypt and Libya are experiencing deep-seated unrest and political powers such as al-Qaeda are vying for control.  

Enter Innocence of Muslims, an inflammatory film which crudely depicts the life of the Prophet Muhammed, painting the prophet as a killer, liar, and child-molesting pervert. The video is also offensive to many because it depicts Muhammad; Islamic traditions forbid depictions of the prophet. Created by Nakoula Basseley Nakoula who goes by the pseudonym Sam Bacile, the film gained very little attention after Bacile first posted it on YouTube in July 2012, until it caught the interest of Egyptian-American Coptic Christian Morris Sadek and pastor Terry Jones in Gainesville, FL, both of whom are known for their fiery anti-Islamic sentiments. Jones boosted the video online, adding his own inflammatory videos alongside it. It wasn’t long before the film became the focus of TV host Sheik Khaled Abdallah of the Islamist satellite-TV station al-Nas in Egypt who is known to be extremely hateful and critical, especially of Coptic Christians.

Abdallah featured clips of Innocence of Muslims on his show, catching the attention of fundamentalist Islamic Salafists. The Salafists, a strong parliamentary power in Egypt, had already been protesting outside of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, demanding the release of a sheik imprisoned in North Carolina for plotting a number of assassinations and bombings in the 1990’s. Inflamed by the video clips shown on Abdallah’s show, the protests increased in size and veracity. A CNN producer who was present at the embassy on September 11, 2012 witnessed several men from the crowd scaling the walls of the U.S. embassy and remove the American flag.

Not far away, in Benghazi, many news outlets reported that the video had sparked protests outside of the U.S. consulate, though not directly outside because the roads had been blocked off. Many sources speculated that the crowds had been infiltrated by a number of al-Qaeda and jihadist groups, but would later come to learn that the attack on Benghazi was a little more organized and premeditated.  

The American forces in Libya are not unfamiliar with protest, however. U.S. intervention in Libya began during the Arab Spring when Libyans were demanding the resignation of Muammar Qadhafi in January of 2011. Ambassador Stevens arrived in Libya in April of that year and would stay to see the civil war end four months later in August. His sole purpose was to establish a connection with the oppositional forces seeking to overthrow Qadhafi’s government. Because of an Obama administration policy which required “no boots on the ground,” Stevens was provided with no military support and no clear protocol or security plan.

After assisting the oppositional forces in successfully ousting Qadhafi, Stevens and Secretary Clinton discussed a plan to establish the Benghazi Mission as a permanent post in Libya, which became Stevens’ primary goal in Libya at the time of the September 11 attack.

Works Cited

Ghosh, Bobby, et al. “Flash Point. (Cover Story).” Time, vol. 180, no. 13, 24 Sept. 2012, pp. 28-34. EBSCOhost, 0-search.ebscohost.com.sophia.agnesscott.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=fth&AN=80126806&site=eds-live.

Hudson, John. “The Egyptian Outrage Peddler Who Sent an Anti-Islam Youtube Clip Viral.” The Atlantic. Sep 13, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/egyptian-outrage-peddler-who-sent-anti-islam-youtube-clip-viral/323660/.  

“Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.” U.S. House of Representatives. Select Committee on Benghazi. Dec 7, 2016, http://benghazi.house.gov/NewInfo.

Staff, CNN Wire. “Protester attack U.S. diplomatic compounds in Egypt, Libya.” CNN. Sept 12, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/11/world/meast/egpyt-us-embassy-protests/.

“The Arab Spring, five years on.” The Economist. n.d. http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/daily-chart-8.

Appendix

Innocence of Muslims movie trailer

(Warning – some may find the content of the video to be offensive)

For video coverage of the protests in Cairo, see CNN article above

BBC Profile of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya

Amnesty International – “Arab Spring Five Years On”

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/arab-spring-five-years-on/

TEDTalk – “Why Libya’s revolution didn’t work – and what might”

In an interview on NPR in November of 2012, former Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill identifies the absence of a reliable host in Benghazi to protect the Mission. Under the Vienna convention, he points out, host states have an obligation to protect diplomats. Under the uncertain government of Benghazi, these protections were not dependable or thorough.

These sentiments were echoed strongly by the Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi which was convened by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The ARB cited “systematic failures in leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels” as the cause of “grossly inadequate” security measure at the Benghazi compound. Requests for increased security were tossed around to different bureaus and never filled, leaving the Mission with a small, inexperienced security staff on short-term assignments, not allowing the personnel to gain intimate knowledge of the compound’s needs or the surrounding area. Understaffing in the Tripoli embassy affected the Benghazi Mission, as well. In August of 2012, the number of State Department Security agents assigned to the Tripoli embassy was decreased from 34 agents to six, not only severely reducing Tripoli’s security resources, but those available to be sent to Benghazi without putting Tripoli at severe risk.

No only was the personnel inadequate, but the ARB also found that the Mission’s uncertain status left it in a difficult position for funding and resource allocation, meaning it would not receive updates security measures such as a heightened perimeter wall, a steel gate for the Villa C safe area, safety grills on windows, and security cameras, all of which could have been beneficial at the time of the attack.

The Board did conclude that U.S. personnel made every possible effort to recover Stevens and Smith and that interagency response, while timely and appropriate, would not have been able to arrive in time to make a significant difference.

Prior to the attack, there was also a very minimal understanding on the American’s behalf of the militias and extremist organizations which thrived in the area. American intelligence on these groups was lacking, preventing Stevens and the security forces at the Mission from understanding the appropriate threat level. While monitoring these groups can be difficult, it has been found that intelligence efforts to analyze them were inadequate.

Works Cited

“Diplomatic Security: What Went Wrong in Benghazi.” Talk of the Nation. NPR. November 13, 2012. http://www.npr.org/2012/11/13/165046179/diplomatic-security-what-went-wrong-in-benghazi.

Kirkpatrick, David D. “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi.” New York Times. Dec 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0.

“Unclassified Version of the Accountability Review Board Report.” New York Times. Accountability Review Board for Benghazi. Dec 18, 2012,  http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/18/us/19benghazi-report.html.

Appendix

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) – see Article 22 for details on embassy security http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf

PBS NewsHour segment in which senior associate for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Frederic Wehrey and journalist Robin Wright discuss the contexts and causes of the Benghazi attack.

Overview of militias in Benghazi following the Arab Spring, including the 17 February Martyrs Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia

On September 12, the day after the attack, President Barack Obama addressed the nation from the Rose Garden of the White House. He referred to the attack as “acts of terror.” “The United States condemns in the strongest terms this outrageous and shocking act,” he said. “No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation.” Later in the day, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made her own statements on the attack. Her comments were vague, offering no definitive information on the details of the events, but briefly mentioning that some suspicion has been pointed toward the protest of the inflammatory film. These two sets of comments quickly came under fire from mainly conservative critics who believed that the Administration failed to significantly acknowledge that the attack was a terrorist attack. Hillary Clinton has also been harshly criticized for what many believe to be an effort to blame the attack on the film and subsequent protests and cover up possible Al Qaeda involvement.

Both Hillary Clinton and then Press Secretary Jay Carney were careful to point out that the protests were not of any specific U.S. policy and that the United States is in no way connected to the film Innocence of Muslims.

Over the next couple of days, messages out of the White House were mixed. Jay Carney remained vague, stating that the State was not aware of any “actionable intelligence indicating that an attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi was planned or imminent.” In contrast, a senior White House official, in an interview with CNN, claimed that the events were “clearly a planned military-type attack.” On September 16, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice went on CNN’s “State of the Union” and stated that the protests played a role in the violence against the embassy in Benghazi. She also said that there was no evidence that the attack was premeditated or planned. Her statements on “State of the Union” have been the subject of much criticism; some felt that her words were misleading and called for her resignation. Others defend her, saying that she was pushed out into the public eye, uninformed and unprepared. The Administration continued to state that there was not adequate evidence to declare the attack a terrorist attack.

It was not until September 21 that Clinton directly referred to Benghazi as a terrorist attack, saying, “What happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack, and we will not rest until we have tracked down and brought to justice the terrorists who murdered four Americans.”

Following investigations of the attack have found that extremist groups were involved. Clinton has come under strong fire because of emails uncovered during the House Select Committee’s 2015 investigation in which she referred to the attackers as an “al-Qaeda-like group” in an email to her daughter, Chelsea Clinton. The investigation also uncovered transcripts of a phone conversation between Clinton and Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Qandil in which she said, “We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with the film. It was a planned attack — not a protest.” She then continues to say that they believe the attackers to be affiliated with al Qaeda. To some, these documents were further evidence of a supposed intention to cover up what they believed to be al Qaeda’s role in the attack.

The Republican Congress played a significant role in these accusations, pointing fingers at the Obama Administration. On the other hand, Democratic leaders, most notably then Vice President Joe Biden, found Republicans at fault for their 10 percent budget cut for embassy security.

The Washington Post estimates that there have been at least ten inquiries or investigations on the Benghazi attack and its surrounding issues have been opened by various agencies and Senate and House committees. The fallout from the investigations has included the removal of four State Department officials in response to criticisms of “grossly inadequate” security and failures of leadership.

Despite the removal of these individuals, many still find extreme fault with the heads of State in the Obama Administration. These ideas and criticisms have had extraordinary effects on politics for years after the attack.

Works Cited

Fisher, Max. “Who’s to Blame for Benghazi? A Layman’s Guide.” The Washington Post. Nov 6, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2012/11/06/whos-to-blame-for-benghazi-a-laymans-guide/?utm_term=.49a3f567bf95.

Gordon, Michael R. and Eric Schmitt. “4 Are Out at State Dpt. After Scathing Report on Benghazi Attack.” New York Times. Dec 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/us/politics/3-state-dept-officials-resign-following-benghazi-report.html?hp.

“Interim Progress Report for the Members of the House Republican Conference on the Events Surrounding the September 11, 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, Libya.” House Republican Conference. n.d., http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Libya-Progress-Report-Final-1.pdf.

Kiely, Eugene. “The Benghazi Timeline, Clinton Edition.” FactCheck.Org. June 30, 2016, http://www.factcheck.org/2016/06/the-benghazi-timeline-clinton-edition/.

Pearson, Michael. “What the Obama Administration Has Said about the Libya Attack.” CNN. May 8, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/10/world/libya-attack-statements/index.html.

Ross, Janell. “The Benghazi Controversy, Explained by 7 Numbers.” The Washington Post. Oct 22, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/10/22/the-benghazi-controversy-explained-by-7-numbers/?utm_term=.99fbf57064a9.

Appendix

President Obama’s Rose Garden Speech

Clinton’s Controversial Email to her Daughter

Transcript of Clinton Conversation with Egyptian Prime Minister

The role of Al Qaeda is another source of disagreement. Contrary to Congressional reports that claimed Al Qaeda held a significant role in the attack, a Times investigation found no evidence of Al Qaeda involvement, and instead found legitimacy in theories that the attacks were fueled by the film Innocence of Muslims. The Times report did find that many local militias and extremist groups were involved in the attack, even though they may not have been the initial attackers. Times reporter David Kirkpatrick disagreed with Congressional claims, concluding that extremist militia leader Abu Khattala was the orchestrator of the event.  Khattala initially denied any role in the attack.

While most sources agree that extremist groups and militias were involved in the attack in some capacity, the presence of protesters has been a subject of much debate. David Kirkpatrick and the members of the Accountability Review Board convened by Hillary Clinton came to opposite conclusions regarding the presence of the protest. Kirkpatrick found that the initial attack was motivated by the film and was quickly joined by other fighters and extremist members as rumor spread, but could find no evidence of Al Qaeda involvement. The House Select Committee did find reasonable evidence of Al Qaeda’s role in the attacks. Republicans saw this as definitive evidence that their claims against the Obama Administration were grounded. Republicans had already been accusing the Obama Administration of covering up evidence of Al Qaeda’s role to avoid undermining the President’s claim that the group has been decimated, in part because of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

Popular culture portrayals of the attack have only added fuel to the fire. The most significant of these representations may be the Michael Bay film, 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi.  13 Hours seeks to tell the tale of 6 soldiers stationed at the CIA Annex. The film is based on the experiences of a group of soldiers who were involved in the attacks and have since spoken out about what they believe to be government cover-ups of what really happened. The film has since been highly politicized and the men have gone on numerous interviews and TV shows to speak about their experiences.

Mainstream journalism balked at these claims of government lies and cover-ups. Alex Koppelman for The New Yorker investigated the hundreds of Hillary Clinton’s emails regarding Benghazi that were released, and concluded that “there is certainly no evidence of the darkest, most outlandish conspiracy theory about Benghazi: that the Administration left Americans to die because they were worried that responding to the incident with the force needed to beat back the assault would undermine President Obama’s counterterrorism record.” Here, Koppelman refers to yet another criticism of Obama: that his counterterrorism efforts are largely unsuccessful, as shown in shocking events such as the Boston Marathon bombing and Benghazi.

Works Cited

Frizell, Sam. “The True Story Behind the Benghazi Movie 13 Hours.” Jan 13, 2016, http://time.com/4178593/benghazi-movie-13-hours-accuracy-fact-check/.

Kirkpatrick, David D., “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi.” New York Times, Dec. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0.

Koppelman, Alex. “What the Benghazi Emails Reveal about Benghazi.” The New Yorker. May 16, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-the-benghazi-e-mails-reveal-about-washington.

“Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.” U.S. House of Representatives. Select Committee on Benghazi. Dec 7, 2016, http://benghazi.house.gov/NewInfo.

Shane, Scott. “House Holds Hearing on Benghazi Attack.” New York Times. May 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/us/questions-and-answers-on-benghazi-and-the-fallout.html

Zeitchik, Steven. “13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, from Michael Bay, revisits Benghazi.” LA Times. Jan 13, 2016,

http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/la-et-mn-benghazi-bay-20160113-story.html#

Appendix

The New Yorker  – “A Conversation with Abu Khattala”

Hundreds of Clinton Emails Regarding Benghazi

13 Hours Official Trailer

FOX Hannity Interview of the 13 Hours soldiers

Just days after the attack, the President of the General National Congress in Libya, Mohammed al-Magaraif responded to the events, strongly condemning them as planned events. “There was planning,” he asserted, “It was not a peaceful protest which degenerated into an armed attack or aggression. That’s how it was planned.” This strong assertion contrasted greatly with American government claims which were hesitant to label the attack before a thorough investigation. A report by Pakistani newspaper Dawn found that the accounts of the attack given by Libyan and American officials were starkly different. The report observes that while American officials were hesitant to label the attacks as terrorism, emphasizing the presence of the protests, the Libyan officials immediately attributed the attack to extremist groups who they said had entered the country just months ago.

These differences in reporting can also be seen in the considerations of who fought in the attack. While American coverage of the details of the attack focuses on the U.S. soldiers involved in the fighting, Middle Eastern sources such as Al Jazeera spend more time covering the Libyan assistance that Americans received. According to these reports, 10 Libyan security guards died and two Libyan staff members were injured in the fighting. When Steven’s body arrived at the local hospital, a doctor attempted to revive him for 90 minutes before declaring him dead.

Middle Eastern sources such as The Jerusalem Post also focus on the local fallout of the attack over a long-term period. Following the Benghazi attack, they report on the increased enthusiasm of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. After significant indications of reasonable threats to American embassies, which resulted in the decision to close 19 American embassies and consulates throughout the Middle East for almost a week in August of 2013, in an almost unprecedented decision. These news outlets continued to track extremist threats to foreign presences for months and years to follow the September 12 attack.

Libyan sources, in particular, are especially critical of the United States and their handling of the attack. The Obama doctrine comes under fire for focusing on “inner-city teenage ‘rioting,’” and other small-scale issues and turning a blind eye to enormously concerning issues such as weapons suppliers providing Syria and Libya with arms. Upon the apprehension of suspected orchestrator Ahmed Abu Khatallah, Libyans were concerned that the United States would not give him due process with a lawyer and judge in light of the United States’ record with Guantanamo Bay Prison.

These non-western sources provide new details which are not present in western new coverage of the attack. By expanding the pool of sources, the narrative became a deeper and more nuanced issue, especially when placed in the context of Libya’s political climate.

Works Cited

Baraka, Ajamu. “Africa: War, Repression and International Gangsterism – U.S. State Policy From Benghazi to Baltimore.” All Africa. Nov 4, 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201511090514.html.

“Libya: U.S. – Ensure Benghazi Suspect’s Rights – Rightly Charged in Federal Court, Not Guantanamo Military Commissions” All Africa. June 18, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201406190948.html.

US Envoy Dies in Benghazi Consulate Attack.” Al Jazeera. Sept 12, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/20129112108737726.html.

“US, Libya Differ on Accounts of Benghazi Attack.” Dawn. Sep 17, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/749966/us-libya-differ-on-accounts-of-benghazi-attack.

“US Consulate Attack Was Planned: Libya Assembly Head.” Dawn. Sep 15, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/749561/us-consulate-attack-was-planned-libya-assembly-head.

Wilner, Michael. “Target Not Necessarily Embassies as US Extends Worldwide Alert.” The Jerusalem Post. Aug 5, 2013,  http://www.jpost.com/International/Target-not-necessarily-embassies-as-US-extends-worldwide-alert-322122.

Appendix

Glimpse into Life in Libya after the Arab Spring

The Guardian World News Guide

The Benghazi project, in particular, made me acutely aware of how dependent I am on American and Western media to receive my news. I found it extremely difficult to find international sources outside of my comfort zone. In the future, I will need to make a more intentional effort to seek out alternate and broader sources.  I feel that I am knowledgeable of events that directly affect me and those that are covered in mainstream American and European media. I do not, however, have a satisfactory understanding or knowledge of international issues, specifically African, Asian, and South American issues. Those are incredibly large and significant parts of the world, so it is very regrettable that I do not know more about them.

The Benghazi Project also expanded my understanding of politics in the Middle East and North Africa. As these governments and political environments are wholly unfamiliar to me, I had to stretch my understandings in order to complete the project thoroughly. It also built upon my basic knowledge of the events of the Arab Spring, which I now know more about.

I do feel confident in my ability to evaluate the value and quality of a source. In this project, I tried to reach out to some sources I have never used before, such as government documents, but still found myself reaching for more familiar outlets such as the Times. Once again, in this area, I see that I have difficulty evaluating non-western sources because I find it more challenging to identify possible biases because I am unfamiliar with the politics and culture of non-western countries. I think that my confidence in finding good sources was fairly high before beginning the course, so I don’t think it has raised any this semester. From listening to SERIAL, though, I have begun to more greatly appreciate the value of a variety of types of sources, such as maps, interviews, and documents. These pieces of the podcasts were so helpful but also contributed to the level of reporting that was so high in SERIAL.

I feel that the topics covered in the course, coupled with the Benghazi Project and podcast responses, have influenced me to become more engaged in global affairs. Now, I find myself making connections between events and people that I would have never realized before. By gaining even a little bit more knowledge in unfamiliar political environments, I am able to explore more complex issues with more comfort and insight. Overall, the course was incredibly beneficial for developing my political thought.