Episode 1: From Dusk ’till Dawn

On the 11-year anniversary of the extraordinary display of terror on 9/11, U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens remained inside the compound of the American consulate in Benghazi, Libya in order to ensure his safety. This would prove to be a fatal decision. Shortly after turning in for the night, Ambassador Stevens and the compound would be under a fierce attack.

First Wave

Earlier that morning, Stevens had met with several people at the compound, including the Turkish consul Ali Akin, who would later remark to the Times on the lack of adequate security at the compound, saying, “No security men, no diplomats, nobody….There was no deterrence.”

After Stevens retired to his room at about 9:00 p.m. local time, security camera footage reviewed by American officials showed the Libyan police vehicle stationed outside the compound gates leaving its post and driving away. At approximately 9:40 p.m., agents were alerted of the attackers’ presence by noises of yelling, chanting, and finally, an explosion. Moments later, the monitor in the facilities Tactical Operations Center (TOC) would show an armed throng rushing through the gate, met by at least one armed local guard.

After seeing the crowd rush through the gate, a Diplomatic Security (DS) agent stationed in the TOC sounded an audible alarm throughout the compound, alerting its occupants that the compound was under attack. After issuing the alarm, he would then go on to contact the CIA Annex located about a mile away. This line of contact remained open throughout the attack.

At the time of the attack, there were four DS agents in the compound where Ambassador Stevens was residing. Three left to retrieve weapons and tactical gear, while another, Sean Smith, accompanied Stevens to a safe haven in the building — a fortified area designed to protect the Ambassador from such attacks as this one. The armed guards, referred to as the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, who met the attackers at the gate were corralled into their barracks, which were then set on fire. None of the Martyrs Brigade would be killed that night.

At 10:05 p.m., when the White House was just receiving news of the attack, Villa C, which contained the safe haven occupied by Stevens and two DS agents, was engulfed in flames. Contact between Stevens and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli had been severed. The DS agent with Smith and Stevens later reported that he led the two into the bathroom, planning to escape through a window there, but found that Stevens and Smith were no longer behind him. He escaped the room to gain relief from the harsh smoke and heat but returned into the building multiple times in an attempt to recover the two men.

In a later recovery mission, a DS agent recovered Smith from the building and he was unresponsive. At 11:01 p.m., Sean Smith was declared to be killed in action. It would not be until about 1:00 a.m. that local Libyans would recover Stevens’ remains from the main building and transport them to the hospital.

Before contact with Tripoli was lost, Ambassador Stevens managed to inform the Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, Gregory Hicks, of the attack. Hicks led the Embassy staff to take immediate action, requesting permission to redirect a drone in eastern Libya to Benghazi in order to obtain an image of what was occurring on the ground and preparing a rescue team, Team Tripoli. Team Tripoli departed the Tripoli Mitiga Airport at approximately 12:30 a.m., headed for Benghazi, where they would arrive around 5:00 a.m.

Second Wave

While the DS agents were attempting to recover Stevens’ body (they assumed he would not have survived in the building), a second explosion occurred inside the rear gate of the compound. As members of the Global Response Staff (GRS) from the Annex returned fire on the attackers, the Diplomatic Security team packed up and fled the compound in their vehicle, coming under fire from hidden attackers on their way out. As they drove away from the complex, the vehicle came under fire from a man on the road and had two grenades thrown under it, blowing out two of its tires, but not stopping the vehicle. They arrived at the Annex at 11:23 p.m., closely followed by the GRS team who arrived about twenty minutes later to take up defensive positions on the roof of the Annex.

Only an hour later, a group of attackers converged upon the Annex from the East, using small firearms and IEDs to assault the compound. After ten minutes of fighting, the GRS team was able to repel the attackers, who were using a civilian home to defend themselves, knowing the GRS wouldn’t risk harming civilians. In a more organized attempt, the attackers returned more forcibly with increased numbers and sustained heavy fire.

After another break in the fighting, Team Tripoli arrived and was prepared to assist. Shortly before sunrise, another round of small arms fire and mortar attacks occurred, killing two Tripoli fighters, Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty.

At 6:16 a.m., a 50-vehicle armed motorcade supplied by the Libyan Military Intelligence arrived to evacuate all personnel from the annex and deliver them to the airport where they would evacuate to Germany and Tripoli. Interestingly, the group that came to the aid of Americans in Benghazi was not the Libyan government that the State had been attempting to create good relations with, but a group of former military officers under the Qadhafi regime who the U.S. had a role in ousting. Before that night, the CIA had no knowledge of who the Libyan Military Intelligence were.

By the time the sun had risen on the 12th, four Americans had been lost, and the rest were fleeing the country.

Works Cited

“9/11 Attacks.” History.com. A&E Television Networks, 2010. http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks.

Alvarez, Priscilla. “What Happened the Night of the Benghazi Attack.” The Atlantic. June 28, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/house-republicans-benghazi-report-hillary-clinton/489125/.

“Benghazi on the Record: Asked and Answered.” The Select Committee on Benghazi. http://askedandanswered-democrats.benghazi.house.gov/ .

Kirkpatrick, David D., “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi.” New York Times, Dec. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0.

Leiberman, Joseph I. and Susan M. Collins. “Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi.” United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Dec. 30 2012, Google Scholar, http://www.passionforliberty.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Flashing-Red-HSGAC-Special-Report-final.pdf.

“Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.” U.S. House of Representatives. Select Committee on Benghazi. Dec 7, 2016, http://benghazi.house.gov/NewInfo.