After the fall of Qadhafi, the U.S. administration planned to maintain a “light footprint” in Libya, leaving the Benghazi Mission in an ambiguous position, without a clear mission or defined status. Because of this, the compound did not receive adequate security, personnel, or intelligence, leaving it incredibly vulnerable to attacks like the one on September 11.
In an interview on NPR in November of 2012, former Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill identifies the absence of a reliable host in Benghazi to protect the Mission. Under the Vienna convention, he points out, host states have an obligation to protect diplomats. Under the uncertain government of Benghazi, these protections were not dependable or thorough.
These sentiments were echoed strongly by the Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi which was convened by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The ARB cited “systematic failures in leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels” as the cause of “grossly inadequate” security measure at the Benghazi compound. Requests for increased security were tossed around to different bureaus and never filled, leaving the Mission with a small, inexperienced security staff on short-term assignments, not allowing the personnel to gain intimate knowledge of the compound’s needs or the surrounding area. Understaffing in the Tripoli embassy affected the Benghazi Mission, as well. In August of 2012, the number of State Department Security agents assigned to the Tripoli embassy was decreased from 34 agents to six, not only severely reducing Tripoli’s security resources, but those available to be sent to Benghazi without putting Tripoli at severe risk.
No only was the personnel inadequate, but the ARB also found that the Mission’s uncertain status left it in a difficult position for funding and resource allocation, meaning it would not receive updates security measures such as a heightened perimeter wall, a steel gate for the Villa C safe area, safety grills on windows, and security cameras, all of which could have been beneficial at the time of the attack.
The Board did conclude that U.S. personnel made every possible effort to recover Stevens and Smith and that interagency response, while timely and appropriate, would not have been able to arrive in time to make a significant difference.
Prior to the attack, there was also a very minimal understanding on the American’s behalf of the militias and extremist organizations which thrived in the area. American intelligence on these groups was lacking, preventing Stevens and the security forces at the Mission from understanding the appropriate threat level. While monitoring these groups can be difficult, it has been found that intelligence efforts to analyze them were inadequate.
Works Cited
“Diplomatic Security: What Went Wrong in Benghazi.” Talk of the Nation. NPR. November 13, 2012. http://www.npr.org/2012/11/13/165046179/diplomatic-security-what-went-wrong-in-benghazi.
Kirkpatrick, David D. “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi.” New York Times. Dec 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0.
“Unclassified Version of the Accountability Review Board Report.” New York Times. Accountability Review Board for Benghazi. Dec 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/18/us/19benghazi-report.html.
Appendix
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) – see Article 22 for details on embassy security http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf
PBS NewsHour segment in which senior associate for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Frederic Wehrey and journalist Robin Wright discuss the contexts and causes of the Benghazi attack.
Overview of militias in Benghazi following the Arab Spring, including the 17 February Martyrs Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia
